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manufacturerS beware of right to repair:

an analySiS of the reSurgence of right to repair & the legal
conSequenceS of thirD-party acceSS to embeDDeD Software in the
‘internet of thingS’ era
By Lindsey Barrington*

O

I. InTroduCTIon

n March 18, 2019 California became the twentieth
state to introduce Right to Repair legislation in one
year.1 The policy objectives for Right to Repair are
straightforward: advocate for federal and state laws that make
it easier for owners of consumer goods to ix a device when it
breaks rather than relying on the Apple store.2 However, since
2014, small farmers have joined the Right to Repair movement
because major manufacturers, such as John Deere, have
consolidated dealer networks in response to the consolidation of
farming in the past decade.3
While proponents for Right to Repair legislation argue that
consumers should be able to repair the electronics that they
own, the introduction of farming equipment has complicated
the landscape by comparing apples to oranges.4 Right to
Repair bills have classiied consumer goods and equipment
broadly as digital electronic equipment containing “embedded
software.”5 Accordingly, heavy and complex machinery that
contain microprocessors, such as off-highway engines, marine
vessels, construction, and farm equipment, are subject to Right
to Repair legislation rooted in concerns about access to service
information for mass-produced consumer electronics.6
The ‘slippery slope’ of grouping mass-produced consumer
electronics with agricultural and construction equipment began
in the Copyright Ofice.7 In October 2015, the Register of
Copyrights was confronted for the irst time during its Sixth
Triennial Proceeding with the challenging task of simplifying
the diversiied universe of embedded software into one category
or deinition.8
During the 2015 Section 1201 rulemaking session, the
Librarian of Congress evaluated Right to Repair proposals
for Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”) exemptions to anticircumvention for modern
automobiles, agricultural equipment, and machinery grouped
as the ‘vehicle software’ class.9 Ultimately, exemptions were
granted to third-party users, such as independent repair shops
and owners.10 These exemptions were granted based on legal
defenses in the Copyright Act, which limit exclusivity rights for
copyrighted works under ‘fair use’ justiications for copying or
modifying ‘functional’ software.11
Proponents of Right to Repair have made signiicant strides
in gaining access to software from manufacturing companies
by utilizing the exemptions provided in Section 1201 of the
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DMCA.12 Through this process, the exemptions on technological
protection measures (“TPMs”) for motorized land vehicles set a
precedent for circumvention of proprietary software at the federal
level, while also undermining emissions regulatory protections
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
under the Clean Air Act.13
This article argues that the circumvention precedent for
proprietary software, set forth during the 2015 Section 1201
rulemaking session, afirmed the legal justiication for thirdparty users to effectuate broad Right to Repair legislation at the
state level. Part II provides background on the origins of Right
to Repair legislation. It discusses both Congress’ reasoning for
the creation of the DMCA anticircumvention statute and the
litigation in response to the Clean Air Act during the 1990s.
It then compares common law development of the tampering
provision within the Clean Air Act and evaluates how the Clean
Air Act factored into the Section 1201 rulemaking sessions,
which led to current Right to Repair initiatives. Part III analyzes
the extensive legal conlicts and consequences of providing
third-party access to embedded software for diagnostic repairs
and modiications per the Right to Repair provisions. Part IV
recommends that Right to Repair legislation exempt equipment
manufacturers from being classified as manufacturers that
produce ‘digital electronic equipment.’ It recommends that the
evolving digital era requires for the Copyright Ofice to sever
ties with the Library of Congress in its rulemaking process. Part
V concludes by highlighting the legal consequences of Right to
Repair bills that would result if enacted in state.

II. The Clean aIr aCT & orIgInS
oF rIghT To repaIr legISlaTIon
President Nixon enacted the Clean Air Act on December
2, 1970 in order to decrease air pollution caused by a dramatic
increase of cars on the road from urbanization and to quell the
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growing manufacturer concern of inconsistent state standards
that would require manufacturers to develop vehicles differently
for sale in different states.14 After a series of Congressional
proposals in the 1980s, the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment was
established to reduce toxic air emissions and to improve the
enforcement program for compliance purposes.15
In order to better monitor emissions in cars, the 1990
Amendments required auto manufacturers to develop new
technologies and computer systems.16 Although the statute
included provisions that protected independent repair shops
from potential threats of monopolization by manufacturers and
their authorized dealerships, the third-party repair community
became weary of their ability to effectively repair vehicles after
the Clean Air Act mandated that vehicles made after 1996 must
include on-board diagnostic systems (“OBD”).

a. tampering prohibition & the “knowingly” factor
While Right to Repair efforts gained advocates in the
automotive industry, the EPA navigated litigation away
from liability enforcement under the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendment’s tampering provision.17 Although the Clean Air
Act includes statutory language deining the act of tampering,
the Sixth Circuit court in United States vs. Haney Chevrolet,
Inc.18 developed the “knowingly” element when a manufacturer
or dealer, either by removing or replacing a car part, renders a
vehicle noncompliant with emissions standards and releases that
vehicle from his or her custody.19
Shortly after the 1990 Clean Air Act became law, the
court in United States v. Economy Mufler & Tire Center, Inc.20
reafirmed the Sixth Circuit’s deinition of “knowingly” in the
tampering statute.21 The defendant in Economy Mufler replaced
a three-way converter with a two-way converter in violation
of the Clean Air Act’s regulations.22 The court reasoned that,
similar to the employee who removed a “device” or “element
of design” in Haney Chevrolet, the Economy Mufler employee
“knowingly” replaced a three-way converter with a two-way
converter because Economy Mufler regularly received EPAissued compliance notices for converter installations that were
subject to Clean Air Act emissions standards.23
Economy Mufler argued that the employee was ignorant of
the compliance notice and made an honest mistake in replacing
the compliant converter with a noncompliant one.24 However,
the court rejected this argument and expounded on Haney’s
“knowingly” deinition, which does not create an exception to
liability based on ignorance of the environmental statute when
proper notice of the prohibited replacement was provided to the
employer in advance.25
As software became more prevalent in equipment operating
systems during the late 1990s, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”),
on behalf of the EPA, exercised its enforcement power through
a relatively new and controversial rulemaking process termed
“regulation by litigation.”26 Original equipment manufacturers
were held accountable for violations of the tampering statute and
paid millions of dollars in settlement.27 These lawsuits garnered
public attention because the EPA’s claims alleged that Fortune
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100 manufacturing companies deceitfully installed defeat
devices before selling noncompliant vehicles to unassuming
customers.28 As a result, the EPA issued more stringent emissions
standards and compliance with these standards became part of a
manufacturing company’s reputational strength in the market,
while the “greening effect” took deeper roots in American socioeconomic values.29
Conversely, lawsuits brought by plaintiffs alleging product
liability or fraudulent advertising claims related to emissions
control defects in vehicles are generally preempted by the Clean
Air Act.30 However, in 2017, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan denied a motion to dismiss per
the Clean Air Act’s statutory preemption section in favor of the
“knowingly” concept established in Michigan’s duty to disclose
doctrine.31
In Counts v. General Motors, LLC,32 General Motors
(“GM”), argued that the plaintiffs’ claims of a defeat device
in a vehicle that it manufactured and sold should be dismissed
because the claims related to emissions control regulations and
were preempted by Section 209 of the Clean Air Act.33 However,
the plaintiffs argued that fraud and consumer protection claims
are not preempted because they are not attempts to enforce
emissions standards.34

b. Setting the Stage: Section 1201 rulemaking
While the EPA continued to mandate a highly regulated
emissions environment, the courts grappled with the advent
of embedded software in everyday consumer products. 35
In 1998, Congress added Section 1201 to Title 17, which
protects copyright owners from infringement in the new digital
landscape.36 By adopting this provision, Congress made a
decision to provide a remedy for the copyright owner that is
distinct from the traditional rights of the copyright owner under
Section 106 of the Copyright Act.37
The statute supported copyright owners’ use of TPMs
as many copyrighted works, such as video games and other
software, were beginning to be offered to the public in
digital form.38 However, Congress recognized that, in certain
scenarios, circumvention could have a lawful purpose and spur
innovation.39
The original drafters of Section 1201 did not provide an
option to adopt additional exemptions; however, the House
Commerce Committee became concerned that not having the
option to waive the prohibition would undermine the concept
of fair use for consumers and innovators.40 Originally, the
Commerce Committee, in consultation with the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information,
issued DMCA rulemaking with the consultation of the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks and the Register of
Copyrights.41 After a Senate and House conference, Congress
modiied these provisions by shifting the responsibility to the
Librarian of Congress based upon a recommendation from the
Register of Copyrights.42

25

c. common law copyright teSt: iDea v. expreSSion
In 1879, the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Selden43
and established the scope of copyright protections afforded to
original works.44 The Court found that Selden’s book illustrated
only his unique system of book-keeping and reasoned that Baker
read about Selden’s unique system and decided to carry it out in
a different way.45 Therefore, the copyright protection extended
only to the expression of an idea and not to the underlying idea
itself.46
This dichotomy is codified in Section 102(b) of the
Copyright Act that protects the original work of authorship,
but draws a line on non-expressive intellectual concepts, such
as procedures and processes.47 Courts still rely on the Baker
doctrine that copyright protections extend only to expression and
not to ideas, systems, or processes.48 The advent of embedded
software in mass-produced consumer products and other forms
of machinery posed signiicant challenges for the Librarian’s
interpretations of Section 102(b) when applied to complex
software code during the Sixth Triennial Proceeding.49
The proposals from Right to Repair advocates seeking
exemption from circumvention outlined arguments for the
application of traditional copyright limitations, such as merger
and fair use, that stem from the underlying concept of what
is functional software versus what is expressive software.50
However, the circuit court holdings were split on the idea versus
expression dichotomy.51 More importantly, the tests that circuit
courts endorsed to delineate between what is functional and
what is expressive software caused more confusion amongst
lawmakers and the Copyright Ofice, instead of offering a clear
solution.52
During both the 2015 and 2018 rulemaking sessions,
manufacturers and trade associations warned the Librarian of the
potential consequences that the new nature of software posed in
granting exemptions to circumvention for repair purposes.53 In
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,54 Oracle iled suit against
Google alleging that Android’s operating system infringed
Oracle’s copyright protections.55 The jury ultimately found that
Google infringed on Oracle’s copyrights in thirty-seven Java
software packages, but the jury returned a noninfringement
verdict for eight decompiled security iles.56
Although the circuit courts remain split on determining
what is expressive versus functional software, the most recent
Ninth Circuit opinion adopted the Second Circuit’s “abstractioniltration-comparison” test.57 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the bright line approach that an expressive software
component, which is part of a larger, functional component,
is uncopyrightable because it is predominately functional in
controlling processes or systems.58
During the Sixth Triennial Proceeding, the Librarian granted
an exemption to permit circumvention of TPMs that protected
electronic control units (“ECUs”) from circumvention for the
diagnosis, repair, or modiication of vehicle software.59 However,
the Librarian disagreed with the Register’s recommendation
to include language that permitted circumvention of TPMs
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“on behalf of” vehicle and agricultural equipment owners.60
This decision was in response to letters from the EPA, the
California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), and the Department
of Transportation (“DOT”) urging the Librarian to prevent
exemptions on the circumvention of TPMs.61 In addition,
the Librarian refused to enact the exemptions until twelve
months after the conclusion of the rulemaking session in order
for regulatory bodies to prepare for the lifting of the DMCA
prohibition.62
The renewal of circumvention measures for vehicle and
equipment software granted in the Seventh Triennial Proceeding
added a new element of potential circumvention “on behalf
of” third-parties.63 By permitting this language, the Librarian
signiicantly increased the likelihood of third-party tampering
and modiications, while reducing the likelihood of traceability
to the original actor.64

D. the Scope of right to repair proviSionS
State legislative efforts were the next step in enabling thirdparty access to software for Right to Repair advocates.65 In 2019,
Right to Repair have revamped calls for action across the United
States and have garnered national attention from the left-wing of
the Democratic party, such as Elizabeth Warren.66 This national
momentum continues as states are proposing new legislation
into 2020 and supporters are seeking a favorable ruling from the
Federal Trade Commission’s irst Right to Repair hearing on the
federal level.67 However, if one state were to enact a Right to
Repair bill, the legal conlicts arising from federally mandated
Clean Air Act regulations and copyright law are innumerable.68
Right to Repair deines digital electronic equipment as
equipment that is run, in part or in whole, by software embedded
within the equipment.69 This language groups mass-produced
consumer products, such as iPhones and tablets, with large and
complex machinery, inclusive of marine vessels, off-highway
engines, construction and farm equipment, and stationary
generators.70 If a state enacts a Right to Repair bill, original
equipment manufacturers who sell or manufacture in that
state would face liability for third-party emissions violations.
The provisions force manufacturing companies to hand over
proprietary software to third-party users, but the regulatory
environment remains intact.71 Moreover, the state would be
responsible for regulating emissions based on EPA standards
that differ by machine type.72
Although firmware is normally encrypted and not
proprietary, the deinition of irmware pursuant to Right to
Repair legislation includes several types of code that courts
have protected from circumvention under Section 102(b).73
Moreover, most bills require that manufacturers make available
to independent repair shops or equipment owners the same
diagnostic, and repair information that they make available to
authorized repair dealers and at no cost to the third-party.74
Notably, some states, such as Minnesota, Illinois, and
Massachusetts, require that manufacturers of digital electronic
devices sold or used in the state must make all diagnostic
repair tools available to third-party users that are provided to a
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

manufacturer’s engineering staff.75 In addition, most Right to
Repair bills include a provision that would force manufacturers
of digital electronic equipment for sale or use in-state to allow
third-parties the ability to unlock security-related software
modules for repair purposes.76

III. Blurred lIneS: an analySIS oF The
legal ImplICaTIonS oF aCTIve STaTe rIghT
To repaIr legISlaTIon
Right to Repair advocacy groups, such as iFixit and Repair.
org, set the legal precedent for classifying mass-produced digital
electronic devices with agricultural equipment in the Section
1201 rulemaking sessions.77 However, lawmakers in several
states have drafted Right to Repair bills with extremely broad
provisions that would effectuate burdensome liability and
litigation costs on manufacturing companies if enacted in one
state.78

a. impact #1: enforcing emiSSionS StanDarDS
Courts apply the Haney “knowingly” element of the
tampering statute to establish liability when the manufacturer
or dealer knew or should have known that by removing,
bypassing, or modifying an emissions control device, he or she
would violate the Clean Air Act.79 However, if a state enacted
Right to Repair legislation, the manufacturer or dealer could be
held liable for third-party violations because the “knowingly”
provision assumes a heightened standard for the manufacturer or
authorized dealer in relation to the customer or owner.80
While Right to Repair legislation is silent on third-party
liability, the provisions requiring access to proprietary code
and irmware effectuates an equal relationship between the
authorized dealer and third-party user in terms of the ability to
modify software and render equipment noncompliant with the
Clean Air Act.81 In some states, the extent of this unauthorized
access is the same as highly trained engineers responsible for
writing complex source code for the repair of operating systems
within agricultural and industrial equipment.82
Right to Repair legislation creates a liability structure that
requires the manufacturer to remain compliant with federal
regulations throughout the manufacture and sale of equipment in
a state that lawfully provides repair shops and owners the right
to access software, which could modify or bypass emissions
control devices.83
The regulatory world that equipment manufacturers live
in requires signiicant compliance costs in order to develop
equipment parts and software pursuant to Clean Air Act
regulations.84 In addition, these regulations differ for marine
vessels, nonroad construction, farm equipment, and off-highway
engines.85 Under Right to Repair legislation, the third-party
responsibility to remain compliant with stringent emissions
standards for complex machinery categorized as digital
electronic equipment is extremely ambiguous.86 If a third-party
intentionally or unintentionally modiied an emissions device,
the third-party, in certain states, could sue the manufacturer for
failure to provide appropriate diagnostic tools.87
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As equipment technology continues to develop, repairs
require modiications to sophisticated software embedded in
the machine’s operating systems that are rarely tangible and
increasingly more dificult to trace, if modiied, for reporting
purposes.88 Accordingly, in a Right to Repair state, a court’s
ability to objectively apply the “knowingly” standard in Section
203(a)(3) of the Clean Air Act becomes almost impossible
for two primary reasons.89 First, unlike the court in Economy
Mufler, courts in jurisdictions with Right to Repair legislation
would evaluate complex code or modiications to software
instead of tangible parts that modiied emissions in the vehicle
or engine.90 Second, the court would apply the “knowingly”
indicator on a standard of review that would no longer exist due
to third-party access to code and irmware.91 The DOJ would
bring claims against the state or manufacturer for unlawful
modiications that would not be easily traced back to the original
modiier.92 Moreover, the “knowingly” standard would take on
a different meaning because third-parties are provided access
to software in the same manner as dealers and, in some cases,
engineers, but without the reasonable training required to make
sophisticated diagnostic repairs.93
Although courts have held major manufacturing companies,
such as Volkswagen, liable under the tampering statute for
“knowingly” developing software algorithms or defeat devices
that bypass emissions standards in vehicles, the application of
the “knowingly” standard was unambiguous. Federal reporting
and testing requirements suficiently proved knowledge prior
to distribution and sale.94 The primary legal issue that Right to
Repair legislation would pose to both federal and state courts is
the ability to apply the “knowingly” standard on a third-party
populace, which is relatively unregulated and not properly
trained, but legally allowed access to highly sophisticated code
and irmware.95
Section 203(a) of the Clean Air Act requires that any
modiications on engines or equipment must be reported to the
original manufacturer and recertiied.96 If a Right to Repair bill
were enacted in state, the court’s holding in Economy Mufler
indicates that the EPA could succeed in a defeat device claim
against an independent shop owner for an employee violation
if someone reported the violation.97 However, the individual
equipment owner’s access to irmware and proprietary codes
would create signiicant hurdles to both EPA compliance efforts
for reporting and testing emissions regulations.98
Moreover, Right to Repair legislation affords third-party
equipment owners access to software that controls emissions
regulation, but without requiring the supervision of an employer
or trained engineer.99 The problems with enforcement of the
Clean Air Act stem from the lack of compliance with the federal
regulatory structure that Right to Repair legislation endorses
through untrained third-party access to complex equipment
software.100
Although Right to Repair provisions would, in practice,
require companies to change how they operate prior to the sale
of new engines and vehicles in order to avoid noncompliance, it
is not clear how different jurisdictions would interpret the extent
27

of third-party access to software that could modify emissions.101
Further, if a state enacted Right to Repair legislation, the EPA
would have to expend resources on monitoring violations of
emissions regulations in order for the DOJ to justify bringing a
preemption claim in federal court.102
The EPA’s regulation by litigation enforcement tactic would
require constant surveillance of reporting and testing in states
with Right to Repair legislation.103 In essence, this state-by-state
repair requirement unduly burdens manufacturers and dealers
by forcing signiicant resource allocation towards outitting
equipment differently for sale in each state. 104 Although
Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act bars states from adopting or
attempting to enforce emissions standards, the Right to Repair
legislation has the ability to unravel the Clean Air Act’s purpose
without legally falling in scope of preemption.105

b. impact #2: a patchwork of StateS
Even if Right to Repair legislation could be preempted
by Section 209(a), the court in General Motors, applied the
consumer law duty to disclose doctrine in analyzing claims
that GM “knowingly” sold a vehicle with a defeat device
that created the appearance of low emissions.106 Similar to
the tampering provision, the duty to disclose doctrine placed
GM in a distinguished class of superior industry knowledge,
which required greater adherence to consumer protections in
distributing the sale of complex machinery into the stream of
commerce.107
If the court applied the duty to disclose doctrine in a Right
to Repair state, the plaintiff would strategically beneit from
alleging a consumer protection claim that would fail to apply
to Section 209 of the Clean Air Act.108 Under the state court
standard of review, the plaintiff could bring claims that put him
or her in an implied inferior position of being in a position to
know of the defeat device prior to purchasing or selling the
vehicle or engine.109
Accordingly, states with a consumer protection duty to
disclose requirement that enact Right to Repair legislation
would expose manufacturing companies to a damaging liability
structure both pre-and-post sale.110 For example, if manufacturers
are required to provide third-party owners and repair shops the
same access to proprietary software as its engineering staff, then
the manufacturing company loses its ‘exclusive’ or ‘superior’
knowledge status in relation to the consumer.111 However, the
manufacturer is not afforded any protection against third-party
modiications while being forced to provide the proprietary
software in active Right to Repair legislation.112 Plaintiffs could
bring consumer protection suits similar to those in the General
Motors case that would not be preempted by the Clean Air Act;
however, courts would be completely devoid of clear traceability
to the exclusive knowledge of the deceitful modiication prior to
the sale or purchase that would ix liability.113
Under the duty to disclose doctrine, the threshold to
constitute “active concealment of material fact” is met when
the defendant installs a defeat device prior to distribution.114
Therefore, the manufacturer’s ability to monitor third-party
28

modiications in each state becomes nearly impossible and
unduly burdensome.115 This concrete example is one of several
that could dismantle Congress’ literal purpose in enacting the
Clean Air Act, which prevents claims that have no effect on the
applicable emissions standards and, if accepted, would lead to a
chaotic patchwork of state standards.116

c. preemption potential
During both the 2015 and 2018 public hearings for the
Section 1201 rulemaking sessions, manufacturers and industry
experts expressed concerns about granting exemptions to
anticircumvention because of the sophistication of software
in electronic equipment.117 The idea-expression dichotomy
became less discernible and manufacturers feared that allowing
unauthorized third-party access to diagnostic software would
lead to violations against tampering prohibitions, intellectual
property protections, and liability protections.118
The Right to Repair provisions requiring manufacturing
companies to provide firmware, security-locks, and other
diagnostic services that are provided to authorized dealers and,
in some cases, engineers, could face potential federal preemption
by Section 106 of the Copyright Act and/or could fail the licensee
versus ownership test.119 However, unlike the environment in
2015, the rapid development of embedded software in nearly all
products and machinery suggest that copyright law is in need of
signiicant alteration to afford the protections necessary for the
rapid advancements in technology.120
Congress stated in Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act that
no person may claim entitlement to a grant of rights under the
common law or any State which are equivalent to the exclusive
rights within Section 106 or within subject matter of Sections
102 and 103.121 As explained earlier, the Right to Repair
provisional language that would most likely be preempted by
the Copyright Act under Section 106 is the requirement for a
manufacturer to provide software including, but not limited to,
proprietary software, such as microcode or root code.122
The broad scope of this language would likely interfere
with the exclusive right and protection of source code that
the Copyright Act affords its owners.123 The idea-expressive
dichotomy in Section 102(b) makes clear that originality of
software makes the software eligible for copyright protection
but does not necessarily mean that every aspect is protected if
there are predominately functional components.124
Understanding what is and what is not protected from
preemption under the Copyright Act took on a new and
ambiguous meaning with electronic equipment.125 Moreover,
the different idea-expressive tests employed by the Second and
Tenth circuit courts concerning software infringement adds to
this developing “swiss cheese” impact in analyzing how Right
to Repair state law could be preempted by the Copyright Act.126
For example, the exclusive right protection in Section 106
would traditionally preempt Right to Repair state legislation and
prevent third-party access to the manufacturer’s exclusive right
to proprietary software.127
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However, the Section 1201 anticircumvention exemption
process that “unlocked” proprietary software for third-party
repair purposes has already conlicted with the manufacturers’
exclusive right protections in Section 106.128 Now that
exemptions have been granted to circumvent proprietary
software for repairs on electronic equipment and circuit courts
are split on copyright infringement tests for software in general,
who is to stop the states from demanding access to source
code?129
The current circuit split on interpretations of Section
102(b) could allow for circumvention of source and/or access
code to third-party repair shops and owners under Right to
Repair legislation.130 Copyright protection extends to computer
programs as “literary works” pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1).131 However, the functionality of a software program has
been interpreted by the courts to serve as a defense against the
copyright protections afforded to expressive works.132
Under the Oracle abstraction-iltration-comparison test, the
courts would have to interpret software in complex machinery
that functions on many operating systems instead of one
computer software program.133 The court would then have to
extract the uncopyrightable code including expressive source
code that is incidental to the predominately functional code
under review.134 The problematic aspect of this common law test
is that it has only been applied to basic software programs versus
sophisticated operating systems in heavy equipment.135
Moreover, other circuit courts have interpreted Section
102(b) of the Copyright Act to deny copyright protection to
software systems that contain expressive components, but are
used in a functional manner or deinition.136 This bright line
approach would be the most damaging if applied to Right to
Repair legislation for manufacturers of heavy and complex
equipment because most all operating systems include irmware
or software embedded within the machinery that has a functional
purpose.137
Courts utilize a four factor test in deciding whether a work
affords copyright protections.138 In applying Oracle’s opinion to
Right to Repair legislation, the fair use afirmative defense to
copyright protection could be very detrimental to manufacturing
companies.139 Although the other three factors could be framed
against protections for proprietary software in the context of
Right to Repair bills, the irst factor requires that the court must
inquire into the commercial nature of the use.140 If the court
inds that the use of the copyrighted work is commercial, then
the fair use defense is generally dismissed.141 In the context of
self-repair, the fair use analysis would generally be supported by
a non-commercial use standard of repair and, thus, proprietary
software would be subject to a ruling that would allow for
circumvention under Section 1201.142
Moreover, there are exceptions to preemption by the
Copyright Act that would allow states to grant additional
rights that are different from those in a copyright.143 One such
exception is if the violation of a right is not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights under copyright law, then the state common
law or statute will be protected from preemption.144 For example,
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if Right to Repair legislation required distribution of irmware
that was not technically proprietary because it did not contain
unencrypted source code to third-party repair shops and owners,
the distribution of this material to unauthorized repair shops
and owners could be outside of the copyright law entirely.145
However, the practice of putting this type of information into
the hands of untrained personnel becomes magniied due to the
complexities of the machinery.146

Iv. wITh greaT power ComeS greaT
reSponSIBIlITy: proaCTIve SoluTIonS For
lawmakerS In The ‘InTerneT oF ThIngS’ era
The 2019 Right to Repair bills include provisions for overly
broad classiications that would force manufacturing companies
and authorized dealers to provide third-party repair shops and
owners with proprietary software.147 This access would expose
manufacturers to unnecessary risk in compliance with the Clean
Air Act.148
The ideal proposal for a solution to this legal conlict would
be to alter the provisional language in the Right to Repair
bills that enact overly broad manufacturer classiications.149
This would exempt complex and heavy machinery from being
subject to the same standards as mass-produced consumer
products.150
There are several reasons for eliminating broad
classifications on software-enabled equipment. The first is
related to compliance with regulations under the Clean Air
Act.151 The second is the liability schema that Right to Repair
legislation would impose on the manufacturer. 152 Heavy
equipment manufacturers are subject to regulatory mandates
provided in EPA and DOT regulations.153 Without suficient
language exempting manufacturers from liability after the sale
of vehicles or engines, the manufacturing company would be
subject to immense compliance costs for servicing products in
state, which would take away from research and development.154
Third and inally, Right to Repair legislation hurts the thirdparty repair campaign’s continuance by grouping electronic
devices with equipment that is federally regulated.155 The
unfortunate fact for Do-It-Yourself proponents is that ‘The
Internet of Things’ era will continue to transform consumers
of everyday products into computer users and new industries
will be brought into the scope of regulatory requirements for
cybersecurity and product liability protections.156 With that
in mind, right to repair organizations should exclude industry
sectors subject to regulations that currently exist.157
In rapid time, the ubiquity of software has fundamentally
changed how major companies, hospitals, and agencies operate
in order to prevent cyber-hacking into control systems that
threaten autonomous mining trucks to basic coffee machines.158
Some states have realized this new reality and revised their
Right to Repair bills to include a particular class of vehicles
or products.159 This significantly reduces the potential for
burdensome liability on equipment manufacturers while
affording protections for productive consumer innovations
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and enabling a streamlined process for future section 1201
rulemaking sessions.
A proposed solution for concerns surrounding the Register’s
Section 1201 rulemaking process should include a re-evaluation
of the role of the Librarian of Congress in granting exemptions
to anticircumvention.160 Given the fast-paced technological
environment, the Librarian of Congress is likely not equipped
for prospective determinations on copyright infringement for
software embedded devices.161
The Sixth and Seventh Triennial reviews indicate that
technology continues to outpace copyright law.162 Although the
statutory law itself may serve the purpose that Congress intended,
the content has changed signiicantly since codiication.163 In
order to account for the introduction of autonomous vehicles and
other ‘smart’ devices, copyright law and its rulemaking process
should fall under the supervision of a federal agency that utilizes
the resources and expertise required to address rulemaking with
a practical understanding of how circumvention exemptions
would impact cybersecurity, regulatory compliance, and
intellectual property law.164
This change would likely not negatively affect the dynamic
between the public and the federal agency oficials in the
rulemaking process for public hearings. However, it would
likely result in a less taxing process on resources spent towards
identifying future legal inconsistences in granting exemptions
within the ever-changing software embedded universe of which
copyright law has recently become involved.165
Finally, as the world becomes increasingly digital and
connected in the ‘Internet of Things’ era, federal agencies
that are affected by software-enabled devices, machinery, and

other smart technologies should continue to weigh protections
for companies and users prospectively.166 The most damaging
factors for circumvention of software in every day consumer
products, automobiles, agricultural equipment, and construction
equipment include the potential for cyber-hacking by bad agents
in foreign countries and other intellectual property concerns
that software embedded devices will continue to create in this
globally interactive setting.167
Therefore, lawmakers should assume a more proactive role
in federal agency regulatory rulemaking processes.168 In doing
so, Congress and the judiciary will better mitigate conlicts
caused by introductions of advanced technologies that both
circumvent and conlate the relationship between the law and the
protections it bestows on the marketplace of goods, producers,
and consumers in the digital age.169

v. ConCluSIon
The concept of Right to Repair is rooted in American
culture. However, the advent of the ‘Internet of Things’ has
required a different approach to circumventing diagnostic
software and access codes that were considered tangible
hardware only a decade ago. Maintaining the appropriate balance
in federal and state law for software-enabled device protections
and consumer ownership rights is not an easy task, but one
that is exceedingly necessary to regulate highly intelligent and
intangible technologies. The current Right to Repair legislation
seeks to put an imbalanced, faulty scale in place by subjecting
the manufacturing company and its dealer network, the thirdparty user, and the safety and health of society as a whole to
unnecessary risk.
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